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BY TIMOTHY SCHILLER
T
he production and sale of electric
power in the United States have
long been considered a natural monopoly
￿ that is, the output of a single firm is
deemed sufficient to supply the entire
market.
Monopoly electric utilities were
permitted in order to achieve econo-
mies of scale, but they were subject to
government regulation to prevent
abuses of monopoly power.
The primary regulators of electric
utilities on the consumer side have
been the public utility commissions in
each state.  Wholesale delivery of
electric power from one utility to
another has been under federal
regulation.  Now, the structure of the
electric utility industry has begun to
change in a direction that may
ultimately lead to an open market
national in scope.
Recent increases in fuel prices
and stronger than expected demand
for electricity across the country have
led to increases in prices for electricity
provided by nonregulated suppliers in
some states, such as California, where
power plant construction by monopoly
utilities has lagged electricity demand.
According to proponents of the new
competitive structure, the current
shortfall in supply will be overcome as
more generating capacity is built and
the electric power industry expands to
become a truly national market.  In
the meantime, higher and more
volatile prices are likely until new
capacity catches up with demand.
Changes in the electric power
industry have not come about over-
night.  Over the past 30 years, changes
in energy markets and power technol-
ogy and developments in economic
theory have converged to produce a
rethinking of the nature of electric
utilities and a movement to revise the
regulations that apply to them.  This
article reviews developments in public
policy and technology that prompted
the restructuring of the electric utility
industry now under way, describes the
new regulatory framework, and looks
at what other developments may lie
ahead.
THE IMPETUS FOR CHANGE
Why is the electric power
industry being restructured now, after
nearly a century of regulation as a
natural monopoly?  (See Traditional
Regulation of Electric Utilities for a
summary of the regulatory structure
under which electric utilities operated
until new laws were enacted.)  To
understand these developments, we
must look at changes that have
occurred in energy technology and
markets during the past several
decades as well as the evolution of
In the last few years signifi-
cant changes have been made in fed-
eral and state laws that cover the in-
dustry.  In 1998, Rhode Island and
Massachusetts opened up their electric
power markets to competition.  The
three states of the Third Federal Re-
serve District soon followed suit.
Pennsylvania began a phased transition
in 1998 that is now complete.  In
1999, New Jersey opened its electric
power market, and Delaware began to
phase in competition among electric
power suppliers.  Since then, the re-
structuring of electric power markets
has picked up momentum.  As of Oc-
tober 2000, 23 states have enacted re-
structuring legislation.  Prior to enact-
ment of the new laws, businesses and
households had no choice but to pur-
chase electricity at regulated rates
from the state-approved monopoly
supplier of electricity.  Now, in the re-
structuring states, purchasers of elec-
tric power may choose from among a
number of state-approved producers or
marketers that compete for customers.
Rewiring the System: Rewiring the System: Rewiring the System: Rewiring the System: Rewiring the System:
The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry





Fed.  Business Review  Q1 2001   27 www.phil.frb.org
T
T T T T Traditional Regulation of Electric Utilities raditional Regulation of Electric Utilities raditional Regulation of Electric Utilities raditional Regulation of Electric Utilities raditional Regulation of Electric Utilities
he first electric utilities in the United States
began operation in the 1880s as small
generators and suppliers of electricity to city
neighborhoods. Municipalities around the
nation regulated entry into the industry
through franchises. These franchises gave
utilities the right, often for a specified number of years, to
supply electricity within defined areas.  In general, these rights
were not exclusive. Thus, competing utilities would often
serve identical or overlapping areas.  As the technology of
electric power generation and transmission developed, utilities
began to serve larger areas, including entire cities. Concentra-
tion increased as utilities merged in some markets and as one
or a few dominant utilities gained market share.  By the first
decade of the 20th century, increasing concentration
prompted a movement toward state and federal regulation.
The first states to undertake regulation of electric
utilities were New York and Wisconsin in 1907. State
regulation had replaced municipal regulation in most states by
1914.  Laws establishing state regulation were broadly based
on the Wisconsin law, which established an independent state
commission to regulate utilities. The commission controlled
entry into the electric utility industry by requiring that new
utilities obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity. In
other words, the commission decided when and where new
utilities could be established.  The commission set service
standards and rates, and it had authority over utilities￿
corporate structure and financial arrangements.  The
commissions reviewed utilities￿ operations and finances,
inspected utilities￿ operations, and responded to complaints
about service or safety from consumers.  Either in response to
utilities￿ requests, or on its own, the commission reviewed and
proposed changes in electric rates.
Consolidation among utilities continued in the
1920s and 1930s, and corporations were formed that
controlled utilities in several states.  These corporations came
under federal regulation with the passage of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act (1935).  This law gave the Securities
and Exchange Commission detailed control over utilities￿
corporate structure.  The commission has approval authority
over holding companies￿ issuance of securities, ownership of
assets, and dealings among subsidiaries.  The law prohibited
utilities from engaging in businesses not related to the
production or transmission of electric power.  The law also
established the Federal Power Commission (renamed the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in 1977) to regulate
utilities involved in interstate wholesale marketing or
transmission of electric power (the sale or delivery of electric
power from one utility to another). Another federal regulator
of electric utilities is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Although primarily concerned with regulating the construc-
tion and operation of nuclear reactors, the commission also
applies antitrust law when it considers a utility￿s application
for a license for a nuclear reactor. *
The state and federal regulatory structure estab-
lished in the early 20th century remained largely unchanged
until the century was nearly over.  Public policy, under both
state and federal governments, was based on the theory of
natural monopoly: electric power was most cheaply provided
by a single supplier at all levels of production and distribution
because of large fixed costs (capital investment in generation,
transmission, and distribution facilities) and economies of
scale.  Public acceptance of this market outcome in order to
achieve lower costs was accompanied by regulation intended
to protect consumers from monopoly abuses in pricing.
Rather than simply dictate prices for electricity,
state commissions tried to establish the requisite size of the
sole supplier of electricity for the franchise areas (in terms of
capital investment), then set rates to ensure the utility earned
a market rate of return on its capital investment.  However,
over time, rates came to be set at various levels for various
classes of users.  State commissions defined types of users ￿
such as residential, industrial (typically large manufacturing
plants), and commercial (such as stores and office buildings)
￿ and size classes and set rates at different levels for them,
often favoring large users.
For most of their history, utilities remained vertically
integrated, franchised, and regulated monopolies. There were
occasional calls to reform the industry￿s structure, and  some
modifications were made to electric power pricing schemes,
notably the introduction of peak-period prices in the late
1970s. Nevertheless, the federal and state regulatory struc-
tures put into place nearly a century ago prevailed until the
pro-competition changes described in this article were put
into effect.
* A brief summary of the state and federal regulatory structure may
be found in Claire Holton Hammond, ￿An Overview of Electric
Utility Regulation,￿ in Electric Power: Deregulation and the Public
Interest, John C. Moorhouse, editor, San Francisco: Pacific Research
Institute for Public Policy, 1986, pp. 31-61.
economic thinking about industrial
organization.  An especially important
development was the formation of
regional transmission grids that
reduced the need for every electric
utility to have enough capacity to
supply all the power needed in its
service area at times of exceptionally
high usage.  New technologies and
stricter environmental regulation also
tended to reduce the cost advantages
of large fossil-fuel steam-power plants.
In the second half of the 20th
century, the nation￿s electric industry
began to feel the strains of growing
demand and rising costs.  In 1965,
New York City suffered a blackout
when the utility supplying the city
experienced problems at a generating
plant and could not obtain power from
nearby utilities.  To prevent future28   Q1 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
blackouts, the nation￿s utilities formed
interconnections to provide back-up
sources of power and an organization
(the North American Electric Reliabil-
ity Council) to oversee their coordina-
tion.  The ability of one utility to tap
others through grids (networks of
interconnected power plants) and
pooling arrangements (joint operating
management of multiple independent
utility companies) meant that each
individual utility no longer needed as
large a capacity as it had previously.
Beginning in the late 1960s,
advances in operating efficiency that
had been achieved almost regularly
with the introduction of new large-
capacity steam-power plants began to
fade.  New large fossil-fuel steam-
power plants failed to achieve the
efficiency in converting heat to
electric power that had been expected
of them, and the reliability of these
large plants, as well as the reliability of
large nuclear steam-power plants,
proved to be less than that of small
plants.  Downtime for maintenance
increased for large plants, both fossil-
fuel and nuclear, making it difficult for
large plants to attain the scale efficien-
cies they had been expected to achieve
through high output rates.  Further-
more, some utilities shifted to lower
operating rates, running their genera-
tors at less than full capacity, to
improve reliability and reduce mainte-
nance needs, further undermining
efficiency.
In the 1970s, utilities￿ costs
increased rapidly.  Costs of fossil fuels
began to rise.  Also during this period,
construction costs for electric utilities
began to rise, and they rose faster than
overall producer prices (Figure 1).
Besides actual costs for construction,
financing costs rose as construction
periods lengthened as a result of the
growing complexity of large power
plants and longer regulatory reviews
during construction. Rising costs led
utilities to postpone or cancel plans to
build more plants. After the accident
at the Three Mile Island nuclear
generating plant in March 1979,
opposition to nuclear power plants
increased and safety regulation
expanded, resulting in a drop in
nuclear plant construction.
As construction and fuel
costs rose in the 1970s, the cost of
electricity began to rise sharply after
falling during the previous decade

























* Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs:
Total Plant-All Steam Generation (Source: Whitman, Requardt
and Associates, LLP)
Producer Price Index-Finished Goods (Source: Bureau of Labor
Statistics)
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in the output capacity of the nation￿s
electric power generators (called
capability) began to slow (Figure 3).
But electricity usage continued to
increase despite some dips associated
with economic slowdowns (Figure 4).
The rising costs of electricity and the
concern that generating capacity
would not increase in line with
growing demand for electric power
prompted a search for new ways to
meet the nation￿s electricity needs.
In the 1970s, the design of
new generating systems focused on
reducing fuel costs, but the new
systems also demonstrated that
electricity could be produced effi-
ciently on a scale much smaller than
that of a typical large steam plant used
by electric utilities.  In addition to
their more economical use of fuel, the
new smaller generators generally
produced less pollution and could be
built and put into operation more
quickly than was possible with the
older technology.  Two main ap-
proaches were implemented.  One was
more efficient cogeneration technol-
ogy.  In cogeneration systems, heat is
produced for an industrial process, and
any excess heat is used to drive a
turbine to produce electric power, or
steam is used to drive an electric
generator, and the waste heat from the
generator is used in an industrial
process. Cogeneration systems are used
mainly by large manufacturing firms.
The other technological innovation
was combined-cycle generating
systems, which use waste heat from gas
turbines (driving electric generators)
to produce steam for steam turbines
(also driving electric generators), thus
getting additional electric power from
the same amount of fuel.  These
technological innovations bolstered
arguments against the economies of
scale model that had motivated the
development of large utility firms and
their regulation.  They also made it
possible for large commercial users of
electricity to produce their own power
or to use the option of producing their
own power as a bargaining strategy to
obtain electricity at negotiated prices
lower than those on existing rate
schedules.
As part of the federal
response to rising energy costs and
slowing expansion of electric capacity,
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act (PURPA) was enacted in 1978.
This law allowed the formation of
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companies that could generate electric
power without being subject to federal
and state regulation as utilities.  The
law also required utilities to purchase
the output of these new suppliers at a
price equivalent to the cost the utility
would incur if it were to build a new
generating plant itself (called avoided
cost). Besides the technological factors
that influenced the new view of
electric markets as legislated in
PURPA, new thinking about the
presumed efficiency of natural
monopolies began to suggest even
further steps in opening electric power
markets to competitive suppliers.
REFINING MONOPOLY THEORY
Around the same time that
questions about the need for and
efficiency of large generating plants
were being raised, economists began to
question the validity of the argument
that the existence of natural monopo-
lies inevitably leads to the combination
of higher prices and lower output that
regulation was intended to overcome.
Consequently, economists began to
offer explanations of how industries
that might be natural monopolies
could, in fact, behave competitively.
The main theory of how
industries with high fixed costs and
economies of scale could be competi-
tive was based on the insight that firms
in such industries could compete to be
the single supplier of an entire market.
Such competition could result in prices
and quantities supplied in that market
at the same levels as would occur if
several firms were competing within
that market.1  Elaboration of this
theory posited that even if only one
firm established itself as the supplier
for the whole market, it could not raise
prices to monopoly levels if there
remained a threat that a new firm
might enter the market.  Markets open
to entry and exit by potential competi-
tors are said to be ￿contestable.￿2   An
important element of contestable
markets is that  competitors￿ sunk costs
are low even if fixed costs are high.
Construction of a large plant is a fixed
cost￿one that has to be incurred in
order for the firm to operate but that
does not vary with the scale of
production.  This fixed cost becomes a
sunk cost if it cannot be recovered by
the firm, say, by selling the plant to
another firm or by switching it to other
uses.
Suppose a firm cannot recoup
the cost of a plant.  Then in determin-
ing how much to produce and how
much to charge for its product, the
firm should ignore these sunk costs.
But a firm that is deciding whether to
enter the industry must take into
account whether it pays to incur the
sunk costs of entry.  The existing firm
that ignores sunk costs can price its
product below that of the potential
entrant that cannot ignore sunk costs.
Under these circumstances, potential
new competitors would be reluctant to
enter the market.  To be contestable,
markets must allow firms to enter
without incurring large sunk costs in
order to begin operations, and they
must not allow firms already in the
market to have exclusive use of already
existing sunk-cost facilities.
The development of contest-
able markets theory began to influence
public policy with respect to regulation
in a variety of industries previously
considered natural monopolies,
notably, air transportation, trucking,
and telecommunications.3  Such
industries were considered natural
monopolies largely because of their
high fixed costs. Elements of contest-
able markets theory, especially the
significance of keeping sunk costs low,
provided a rationale for reevaluating
the regulation of utilities.  For ex-
ample, the separation of generating
facilities from other segments of a
utility￿s operations, especially transmis-
sion facilities, as promoted by the
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission￿s (FERC) orders and state
restructuring laws, is one way of
reducing utilities￿ sunk costs and
making markets more contestable.
Prior to these changes in regulations,
existing generating facilities were sunk-
cost facilities because they could not
easily be sold separately (to recover
their cost of construction) by the
utilities that owned them.  With
restructuring, generating facilities
became more salable, and several
utilities have, in fact, divested their
generating facilities. Likewise, federal
and state mandates on ￿wheeling￿
allow competing power suppliers to use
the same transmission facilities, which
are sunk costs, instead of giving
exclusive use of them to a single
utility.4  Wheeling expands the options
available to an electricity distributor:
the distributor can obtain electricity
from less expensive suppliers to which




Previously viewed as mono-
lithic natural monopolies, electric
utilities have come to be considered
integrated firms, combining three
stages of the electric power supply
system: generation (producing
electricity at generating plants),
transmission (moving electricity over
high-voltage lines from generating
plants to distribution nodes), and
distribution (moving electricity over
low-voltage lines for delivery to the
final user).  Recent federal regulations
have had a major impact on the first
1 An early statement of this theory was by
Harold Demsetz, ￿Why Regulate Utilities?￿
Journal of Law and Economics, 11, April 1968,
pp. 55-65.
2 A detailed explanation of contestable markets
is given in William J. Baumol, John C. Panzer,
and Robert D. Willig, Contestable Markets and
the Theory of Industry Structure, New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982.
3 See, for example, Elizabeth E. Bailey,
￿Contestability and the Design of Regulatory
and Antitrust Policy,￿ American Economic
Review, 71, May 1981, pp. 178-83.  Besides
discussing entry conditions, this article also
discusses the need to handle sunk-cost problems
by encouraging access to or transfer of sunk-cost
facilities.
4 Wheeling is the transmission of electricity
from a first-party producer over the transmission
lines of a second-party utility to a third-party
utility for final distribution to the consumer.  Business Review  Q1 2001   31 www.phil.frb.org
two stages of the electric power supply
system: generation and transmission;
the third stage, distribution, has been
largely unaffected.
The National Energy Policy
Act of 1992 (NEPA) set the stage for
major changes in electric utility
regulation.  NEPA expanded the class
of independent firms and subsidiaries
of utilities that could be formed to
generate electricity without being
subject to federal utility regulation.
These so-called exempt wholesale
generators had first been legalized by
the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy
Act of 1978, as part of the national
government￿s response to high energy
prices in the 1970s.  NEPA also
directed FERC to require wholesale
wheeling.  To implement this mandate,
FERC issued two regulatory orders in
1996 that brought sweeping changes to
the industry.
The first, Order 888, requires
owners of all interstate transmission
lines to make them available to all
power generators under equal terms
for wholesale transmission (wheeling).
Prior to issuing the order, FERC and
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ordered wheeling arrangements for
individual utilities on a case-by-case
basis.  Most transmission lines are
currently owned by utilities, but Order
888 also established standards under
which transmission systems may be
operated as free-standing entities.
Thus, the order laid out a regulatory
framework under which the produc-
tion and transmission of electricity
could be conducted by different
companies instead of being combined
in a single firm, as under the previous
structure of regulated monopoly
utilities.
The second regulatory order,
Order 889, requires every electric
utility to provide all other utilities and
power providers with online, real-time
information about its available
transmission capacity. This informa-
tion provides the basis for spot markets
in transmission capacity, making
wheeling more flexible in responding
to changing needs for electric power in
different areas.  Order 889 also
requires that utilities establish separate
administration and accounting for
their transmission and power-genera-
tion activities.  This provision of Order
889, along with the provisions of
Order 888 that set standards for free-
standing transmission companies,
promotes arm￿s-length dealings
between owners of transmission
systems and power providers.  By
fostering equal access to transmission,
these orders reduce the possibility that
enterprise was the most cost-effective
way to provide electricity.  The new
state laws separate the generation
stage from the transmission and
distribution stages and allow businesses
and households to select their own
supplier.6  At this time, transmission
and distribution remain regulated
monopolies.  Transmission and
distribution systems are operated
mostly by the former monopoly
The new state laws separate the generation stage
from the transmission and distribution stages and
allow businesses and households to select their
own supplier.
owners of transmission systems that
also own generation facilities will
discriminate against other power
providers.  For example, in the absence
of a rule such as Order 889, a firm
owning both generation and transmis-
sion facilities could shift some of its
generation costs to its transmission
operation, thereby lowering its
generation price and raising the price
it charges other power suppliers for
transmission.  Since the states began
deregulation, FERC has been studying
further changes in regulation to
increase competition in the industry.5
NEW STATE REGULATIONS
By opening up power produc-
tion to competition and enforcing
open, nondiscriminatory transmission,
federal policy established market
features that enabled states to open
the retail market to competition for
selling electric power to consumers.
Traditional regulation of electric
utilities was based on the notion that
the three stages of electric supply￿
generation, transmission, and distribu-
tion￿were technically inseparable or
that their combination into a single
utilities, although changes are taking
place in these sectors as well.  (These
changes are discussed in the section on
the future of the industry.)
The new structure of intra-
state electric markets is broadly similar
among the states that have instituted
competitive electric markets.  Firms
that meet certain requirements for
operating standards to ensure reliabil-
ity of supply are allowed to offer
electricity at unregulated prices.
Former monopoly utilities are also
allowed to offer unregulated prices for
electric power.  However, because
these former monopolies created
systems designed to supply the whole
market, they have higher total costs
than new entrants.  Referred to as
￿stranded costs,￿ these expenses result
largely from the utilities￿ reliance on
large plants or long-term contracts for
energy negotiated in the 1970s, when
energy prices were higher than they
are today.  Most state restructuring
laws allow former monopoly utilities to
recoup these expenses through a
charge on all consumers￿ electric bills,
regardless of whether they switch to a
new supplier.  At the same time, most
states require the former utilities to
5 Recently, FERC issued Order 2000, calling for
further separation of transmission and
generation.
6 A supplier may be a utility generator, a non-
utility generator, or a marketing company that
sells power supplied by a generator.32   Q1 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
cap or reduce their combined charges
for electric generation, transmission,
and distribution.  Costs for transmis-
sion and distribution remain regulated,
but they must be separately enumer-
ated on consumers￿ bills.
DEREGULATION IN THIRD
DISTRICT STATES
Changes in federal laws and
regulations paved the way for restruc-
turing, but state action is necessary to
actually bring about changes in the
regulations that govern the electric
power industry.  As noted earlier, 23
states have passed legislation that now
permits or will soon permit retail
consumers to choose electric suppliers.
All three states in the Third District
are among those 23.
Pennsylvania.  Pennsylvania
was not the first state to implement
changes, and it is not the largest state
electricity market.  But it has become
the focus of national attention for its
restructuring experience because a
greater percentage of consumers there
have switched to new electric suppliers
than in any other state.  Consumer
choice was phased in during 1998, and
all state residents gained the right to
choose their electric supplier in
January 1999.  The state law autho-
rized the Public Utility Commission to
cap each former monopoly utility￿s
total combined charges for generation,
transmission, and distribution for four-
and-a-half years.  (Charges for
generation are deregulated, but
transmission and distribution charges
remain under state regulation.)  The
seven former monopoly utilities that
served the state now compete with 23
electric power suppliers for residential
customers and 45 suppliers for
commercial and industrial customers.
As of mid-year 2000, the
percentage of customers that have
switched suppliers from the former
monopoly utilities ranged from just
under 1 percent for the utility that lost
the least customers to 30 percent for
the utility that lost the most customers
for residential service.  For commercial
customers (such as stores and offices)
that switched, the percentages ranged
from 1 percent to 30 percent, and for
industrial customers (such as manufac-
turers), the percentages ranged from
none to 44 percent.
A reason often cited for
Pennsylvania￿s greater participation in
choice of electricity suppliers is the
state￿s treatment of stranded costs.
When it determined the new pricing
structure for generation versus
transmission and distribution charges,
Pennsylvania￿s Public Utility Commis-
sion set the stranded cost charge that
would appear on all consumers￿ bills at
a relatively low amount.  This left the
former monopoly utilities with the
need to recover these costs through
power to the list of products they buy
for their members.  Consortia simplify
the switching process, speed it up, and
increase the number of customers who
switch.  In Pennsylvania, businesses,
school districts, municipal govern-
ments, and even state government
agencies have combined to negotiate
contracts with sole suppliers.  Accord-
ing to the Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission, consortia members have
obtained savings greater than the
average available to individual
customers under the new law allowing
choice of supplier.
A third factor boosting
changes to new suppliers in Pennsylva-
nia is the state￿s extensive consumer-
education program.  The Public Utility
Commission and community organiza-
tions have been very active in provid-
ing information on consumer choice
and instruction in comparison shop-
ping and selecting electric power
providers.
Initial price reductions in
Pennsylvania ranged from 2 percent to
10 percent, depending on the type of
user and the specific provisions of the
service arrangements, such as
interruptibility. In Pennsylvania, as
well as in other restructuring states,
the extent of price reductions in the
longer term will depend on the balance
between the demand for electric power
and the number of new suppliers that
establish themselves in the market.
New Jersey.  New Jersey
enacted consumer choice for electric
(and gas) suppliers in February 1999,
and the program went into effect in
November of that year.  The law
mandated an immediate 5 percent
reduction in total charges for genera-
tion, transmission, and distribution
from former monopoly electric utilities
and provided for further reductions up
to a total of 15 percent, to be main-
tained for at least four years.  The New
Jersey Board of Public Utilities will
determine former monopoly utilities￿
stranded costs and allow their recovery
over an eight-year period.  As of
March 2000, 32 companies had been
licensed as energy suppliers in New
Jersey, in addition to the four former
monopoly utilities operating in the




will probably evolve into
two distinct industries.
the unregulated prices they would
charge for generation.  Consequently,
new suppliers that were allowed to
supply electric power in the state have
been able to charge less for generation
than the former monopoly utilities.
With greater savings possible from
switching electricity suppliers, Pennsyl-
vania residents have switched in
greater numbers, proportionately, than
residents of other states that have
enacted consumer-choice legislation.
Another factor that possibly
accounts for the extent to which
customers have chosen new suppliers
in Pennsylvania is the emergence of
buyers￿ consortia.  Envisioned by some
consumer-advocacy groups as a means
for individual customers to combine
their buying power, consortia are
groups of customers who bargain
jointly with suppliers.  In Pennsylvania,
buyers￿ consortia do not face the
regulatory restrictions that they do in
many other states, and Pennsylvania
has a well-established tradition of
buyers￿ consortia.  In fact, some
existing consortia simply added electric  Business Review  Q1 2001   33 www.phil.frb.org
state.  By the middle of 2000, approxi-
mately 2 percent of the state￿s residen-
tial electric consumers had switched
from their former regulated utility to a




electric restructuring law was signed by
the governor on March 31, 1999, and
will take effect in two stages: large
customers could choose suppliers as of
October 1, 1999, and all customers
can choose starting April 1, 2001.
Rates will be reduced 7.5 percent and
frozen until September 30, 2002.  The
new law provides for recovery of
stranded costs for the state￿s sole
investor-owned electric utility through
a charge applied to large commercial
and industrial electricity users; it does
not apply to small businesses or
residential customers.  As of March
2000, the Public Service Commission
had certified 16 companies as electric-
ity suppliers, in addition to the former
utility.
MORE CHANGES AHEAD?
So far, the restructuring of the
electric power industry has been influ-
enced by developments in economic
theory, electric power technology, and
market structure.  Some of these de-
velopments have advanced further
than others.  For example, the recent
price spikes in California, a restructur-
ing state, have been attributed in part
to the absence of a market in the state
that would permit more efficient trans-
actions between power generators and
power distributors.  Another difficulty
facing California, and states in some
other regions of the country, is the lack
of sufficient capacity in the power grid
for wholesale transmission of power
into the region at times of peak de-
mand.   As the California experience
indicates, merely eliminating mo-
nopoly among utilities is not likely to
provide the hoped-for benefits of a
more complete restructuring of the
electric power industry.
Despite the elimination of
electric power monopolies in many
states, the generation sector of the
industry is not yet fully open.  State
restructuring laws have deregulated
only investor-owned utilities and
cooperatives.  These two classes of
utilities together supplied 81 percent of
the nation￿s electric power in 1998.
The rest of the national supply comes
from federally owned utilities or those
owned by state and local governments.
Although these two classes together
supplied just 19 percent of electric
power in 1998, in some regions of the
country they are dominant.  So far,
these classes of suppliers have not been
included in state restructuring moves.
FERC has recommended that govern-
ment electric utilities open their
transmission systems and be fully
integrated into the emerging national
market, and several bills to this effect
have been introduced in Congress.
The restructuring laws passed
by states to date envision the contin-
ued operation of transmission and
distribution systems as regulated
monopolies.  However, policymakers
have already begun to formulate a
structure that at least partially opens
up the transmission sector of the
electric power industry.  FERC Order
888 established standards under which
transmission systems may be organized
as free-standing entities, referred to as
independent system operators (ISOs),
clearing the regulatory way for such
development.  Several ISOs are
already in operation.7 ISOs are
expected to eliminate discriminatory
practices by separating management of
transmission facilities from their
generator-owners and to set prices that
avoid an undersupply of power or
congestion of the grid.
More recently, FERC has
required all utilities that own, operate,
7 California utility regulators were the first to
approve an ISO, which began operation in
March 1998.  An ISO covering most of
Pennsylvania as well as all of New Jersey and
Delaware was started in April 1998.  The ISOs
that have been established to date are not
identical; they differ considerably in organiza-
tion and operation.
or control interstate transmission
facilities to file proposals to create or
participate in a regional transmission
organization (RTO) that will provide
nondiscriminatory access to transmis-
sion grids.  The RTOs are similar to
ISOs, but FERC has set standards for
RTOs￿ independence from power
suppliers, as well as for geographic
scope, system reliability, and opera-
tional authority and responsibility.  If
the current restructuring trend
continues, electric power generation
and transmission will probably evolve
into two distinct industries.8  Many
details of grid operation need to be
worked out to ensure reliable service
and equitable treatment of power
suppliers.  Transmission organizations,
power suppliers, and FERC are giving
their attention to these details.
While electricity producers
and consumers are adjusting to the
recent changes in the electric power
industry, a potentially more significant
development is looming.  Small
generators that will be located at the
site of use are becoming available for
both industrial and residential users.
Referred to as distributed power, these
small units are dedicated to their
owner￿s or primary user￿s needs;
nevertheless, they can be connected to
the electric distribution system.  At
times when their owner (or primary
user) does not require their full output,
they can provide power through the
distribution system to other users.  In
this way, the system that used to
deliver electricity in only one direc-
tion, from the utility to its customers,
could become a two-way system.
The past few years have
brought great changes in the structure
of the nation￿s electricity system, but
the system is still evolving.
8 This structure would be similar to the court-
ordered separation of telephone service into
distinct local and long-distance markets.  See
Paul L. Joskow and Roger G. Noll, ￿The Bell
Doctrine: Applications in Telecommunications,
Electricity, and Other Network Industries,￿
Stanford Law Review, 51, May 1999, pp. 1249-
1315.